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Title 60, Section 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes: A Unique
Form of Tenancy by the Entirety*
I. Introduction
Husband and Wife buy Blackacre with the intent to live on the property
until death, with the title passing solely to the surviving spouse when the first
spouse dies. Husband wants a tractor to farm Blackacre and uses the property,
unbeknownst to Wife, as collateral to secure a loan to purchase the tractor.
Husband and Wife file separate tax returns, and Husband fails to report the
income produced from the farming of Blackacre. Husband decides to spend
his income at the local gaming facility and consequently defaults on his tractor
loan. After the government successfully sues him for the taxes owed, the
question becomes whether the creditor or the government can satisfy the
obligation owed to it by taking either Husband’s interest or both spouses’
interests in Blackacre.
The manner in which two or more individuals own a piece of property
determines the rights the individuals have in that property.1 Although the
question of whether a tenancy by the entirety, which is how the hypothetical
Husband and Wife own Blackacre, remains a valid form of co-ownership may
seem like old, dusty, disinteresting property law to some, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently addressed the issue in United States v. Craft.2 The validity of
tenancy by the entirety remains relevant not only to those who co-own
property with a spouse, but also to creditors who make secured loans or who
seek satisfaction of an obligation through courtroom procedures.
Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership, traditionally in
real property, between a husband and wife.3 At common law, a tenancy by the
entirety could be created only if the traditional four unities of time, title,
interest, and possession existed, as well as a fifth unity requiring a valid
marriage.4 Modern approaches to tenancy by the entirety among states are too
* The author would like to thank Dean Katheleen Guzman for her valuable insight and
enthusiasm throughout the publication process. The author would also like to thank his family
for its support and dedication to education throughout his lifetime.
1. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (2d ed. 1993).
2. 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (deciding that, regarding Michigan property law, a federal tax lien
could attach to a husband’s interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety).
3. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01[1] (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2005).
4. Id. Sir William Blackstone best summarized the four unities when he said:
The properties of a joint estate are derived from [its] unity, which is fourfold; the
unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession:
or, in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one
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numerous to provide any generalization.5 Some states have abolished tenancy
by the entirety completely, either statutorily6 or by court decision.7 Other
states have statutorily created tenancy by the entirety,8 while others recognize
the entireties ownership through case law.9 Because of the diverse treatment
of tenancy by the entirety in the various states, it is difficult to determine how
many states actually recognize the tenancy.10 What is clear, however, is that
tenancies by the entirety exist in some jurisdictions in the United States.11
Although some states do not recognize tenancies by the entirety, the
Oklahoma legislature statutorily confirmed that tenancies by the entirety exist
in the state by passing title 60, section 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes in 1945 as
an emergency measure to “[provide] for the existence and creation of such
estates.”12 The statute establishes the methods by which individuals can own
estates in joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety in the state of Oklahoma.13
Although the Oklahoma statute clearly establishes tenancies by the entirety
as a valid form of concurrent ownership, Oklahoma courts have had very little
to say about the statute regarding tenancies by the entirety.14 Legislative
history concerning the statute is sparse, but the legislature appears to have
adopted a version of the entireties estate that significantly differs from the
form that existed at common law.15 Specifically, the statute includes a
provision that allows some, but not all, creditors to pursue the obligations of
individual spouses in the entireties property,16 whereas common law tenancies
and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one
and the same undivided possession.
4 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 31.06(b) (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180).
5. 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.01[3].
6. Id. Connecticut, Minnesota, Montana, and Nevada are a few states that, by statute, do
not recognize tenancies by the entirety.
7. Id. California, Kansas, Washington, and Wisconsin are some examples.
8. Id. Examples include Missouri, Oregon, and Wyoming.
9. Id. Mississippi and Virginia are examples.
10. Compare 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.01[3] (stating that “tenancy by the entirety
remains a legitimate form of ownership in . . . 30 states and the District of Columbia”), with 4
THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.06(e) n.110 (stating that “[i]t is believed that 25 American
jurisdictions still recognize tenancies by the entirety”).
11. 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.01[3]; 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.06(e).
12. Act of May 7, 1945, ch. 2, 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws 213 (defining the joint interests of
joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety) (codified at 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001)).
13. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (unamended since 1945).
14. See, e.g., Barton v. Hooker, 1955 OK 78, ¶ 10, 283 P.2d 514, 517 (discussing the statute
as only regarding joint tenancies).
15. See 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74.
16. Id. (“Nothing herein contained shall prevent execution, levy and sale of the interest of
the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a severance.”).
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by the entirety are protected from all creditors who pursue debts of individual
spouses.17 In examining the status of tenancies by the entirety in Oklahoma,
the statute seemingly conflates the tenancy by the entirety with the joint
tenancy, leaving both in existence while failing to differentiate the two.18 The
Oklahoma statute and the few cases interpreting it, however, recognize that
tenancies by the entirety not only exist separately from joint tenancies, but also
strike a unique balance between family-friendly policy and creditor rights.
To better communicate the current status of tenancies by the entirety in
Oklahoma, Part II of this note briefly compares the entireties estate to two
other concurrent interests in property: tenancies in common and joint
tenancies. Part III explores the development of the tenancy by the entirety as
a form of concurrent ownership in Oklahoma, and Part IV analyzes the
consequences of Oklahoma’s tenancy by the entirety statute on concurrent
owners and creditors. Part IV also explores United States v. Craft,19 a recent
U.S. Supreme Court case, and its impact on the status of the entireties estate
in Oklahoma.
II. Historical Comparison of Concurrent Estates
“Whenever two or more persons own the same thing at the same time, a
form of concurrent ownership exists.”20 Although co-ownership allows each
of the owners to use the property, individual ownership in severalty permits
only the single owner to use the property.21 Common law recognized three
types of concurrent estates: joint tenancies, tenancies in common, and
tenancies by the entirety.22
Concurrent estates can be distinguished from one another by two
characteristics: (1) the ability to voluntarily or involuntarily alienate the
property inter vivos, and (2) the ability to transfer the property at death
through testate or intestate succession.23 The treatment of these characteristics
determines what type of concurrent ownership exists in the estate.24 Thus, the
basic common law characteristics of concurrent interests, as well as how

17. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.07(e).
18. This view is shared by a former professor at the University of Oklahoma College of
Law. See generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Co-ownership of Property in Oklahoma, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 585 (1974).
19. 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
20. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 31.01.
21. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 5.1.
22. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 31.01.
23. Id. § 31.02.
24. See id. §§ 31.02, 32.02, 33.02.
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Oklahoma law treats these interests, is essential to understanding the present
state of tenancies by the entirety.25
A. Tenancy in Common: Common Law Versus Current Oklahoma Law
At common law, a tenant in common possessed an interest that could be
transferred inter vivos and passed at death through testate or intestate
succession.26 In relation to the traditional four unities, a tenancy in common
could be created and maintained with only the unity of possession.27 In short,
the unity of possession was what made the tenancy in common a form of
concurrent ownership.28 Without the unity of possession, a single individual
would have owned the property in severalty.29 Tenancies in common were
disfavored at common law compared to joint tenancies and tenancies by the
entirety because the right of survivorship was a favored principle; thus, to
effectively create a tenancy in common, the conveyance creating the estate
required express words of limitation.30
In Oklahoma, as at common law, tenants in common have a joint interest
in the estate but hold separate and distinct titles, which allows the tenants in
common to alienate their interests inter vivos and devise the interests at death
through testate or intestate succession.31 Further, when co-ownership of
undivided shares of property exists because of “conveyances by different
instruments, or at different times, or under any circumstances not giving rise
to the four unities required for joint tenancy,” the estate is held as a tenancy in
common.32 Oklahoma statutory law, however, rejects the common law
preference for joint tenancies and instead favors the modern preference of
tenancies in common for conveyances to two or more individuals.33 Oklahoma

25. A more thorough discussion of the concurrent ownership interests in Oklahoma can be
found in Professor Reynolds’s 1974 article. See generally Reynolds, supra note 18, at 585.
26. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 32.02.
27. Id. § 32.06(a).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 32.06(b)(1) (asserting that the best way to assure a tenancy in common and not the
creation of a joint tenancy with the requisite right of survivorship was to expressly limit the
estate “to A and B, to hold as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants”).
31. See Matthews v. Matthews, 1998 OK 66, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 831, 834-35.
32. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 594 (citing Ball v. Autry, 1966 OK 199, 427 P.2d 424).
33. The modern preference for tenancies in common grew out of the preference for free
alienability of property that the right of survivorship hinders. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, §
32.06(b)(2). See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 184 (2001) (stating that a devise to two or more persons
creates a tenancy in common); see also 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (codifying that express
words are necessary to create a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety).
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courts,34 as well as those from a majority of other states,35 also operate with a
presumption toward tenancies in common.
B. Joint Tenancy: Common Law Versus Current Oklahoma Law
Although joint tenancies are no longer preferred, they are still a form of
concurrent ownership that some co-owners use.36 Historically, a joint tenant
possessed an undivided interest that could be transferred inter vivos, thus
severing the joint tenancy.37 The interest, however, could not be passed at
death through testate or intestate succession.38 When a type of concurrent
ownership did not possess the characteristics of devisability and inheritability,
each co-owner had a “right of survivorship,” meaning that on the death of one
of the co-owners, his interest transferred to the surviving co-owners.39 To
establish a joint tenancy at common law, all four unities were necessary.40 In
short, joint tenants at common law had one and the same interest, ensuing from
the same conveyance, beginning at the same time, and held by the same
undivided possession.41
Oklahoma joint tenancies mirror common law joint tenancies in several key
aspects. First, Oklahoma requires the four unities of time, title, interest, and
possession to create a joint tenancy.42 Second, the principal characteristic of
the estate is the right of survivorship resulting from the lack of devisability or
inheritability.43 Third, either joint tenant can destroy the right of survivorship
by voluntarily severing the joint tenancy through an inter vivos gift or sale of
the joint tenant’s undivided share.44 Lastly, an “involuntary conveyance,”
which occurs when a creditor levies on a joint tenant’s share during his
lifetime, will sever the joint tenancy.45 This severance, like any other act by

34. Gazalski v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram), 1994 OK 51, ¶ 24, 874 P.2d 1282, 1288; see
Alexander v. Alexander, 1975 OK 101, ¶ 12, 538 P.2d 200, 203.
35. See 4 THOMPSON , supra note 4, § 32.06(b)(2) (listing forty-six states, as well as the
District of Columbia, where the presumption favoring tenancies in common is codified by
statute).
36. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001); Barton v. Hooker, 1955 OK 78, ¶¶ 10-11, 283 P.2d 514,
517.
37. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 31.02.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 31.06(b).
41. Id.
42. Clovis v. Clovis, 1969 OK 170, ¶ 16, 460 P.2d 878, 881.
43. Id.
44. Shackleton v. Sherrard, 1963 OK 193, ¶¶ 12-15, 385 P.2d 898, 901-02.
45. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 592.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005

322

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:317

a joint tenant that is inconsistent with the maintenance of the joint tenancy,
will result in a tenancy in common.46
Oklahoma law differs from the common law regarding joint tenancies in
two respects.47 First, to create a joint tenancy in Oklahoma, the grantor must
expressly declare his intent that the estate be held in a joint tenancy and not as
a tenancy in common.48 Second, an owner of property in severalty may grant
to himself and another an estate in joint tenancy in that same property, even
though such a conveyance would lack the unities of time and title.49 This
second difference results in a category of joint tenancies created not by a
conveyance encompassing the four common law unities, but instead by the
statutory language of title 60, section 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes.50 Creation
of a joint tenancy pursuant to the statutory language allows the creation of a
joint tenancy by methods not existing at common law.51
C. Common Law Tenancy by the Entirety
At common law, a tenant by the entirety possessed an interest that could not
be devised or passed through intestate succession.52 When an estate lacked
either of these two characteristics, a right of survivorship existed.53 As noted,
this right was characteristic of both a tenancy by the entirety and a joint
tenancy.54 A distinguishing factor between tenancies by the entirety and joint
tenancies was that a joint tenant, by an inter vivos alienation of his undivided
share in the estate, could destroy the other joint tenant’s right of survivorship.55
This right of alienability did not exist in an estate held by tenants by the
entirety because holders of such estates each owned the whole of the estate and
not an undivided share.56 Therefore, only divorce or mutual agreement of the
husband and wife could destroy a right of survivorship for a tenancy by the
entirety estate.57
All four traditional unities were essential, as well as a fifth unity of
marriage, to create a tenancy by the entirety at common law.58 Because all of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Shackleton, ¶¶ 12-15, 385 P.2d at 901-02.
60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001).
Barton v. Hooker, 1955 OK 78, ¶ 10, 283 P.2d 514, 517.
Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 283 P.2d at 517.
Raney v. Diehl, 1971 OK 28, ¶¶ 17-18, 482 P.2d 585, 590.
Id.
4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.02.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 33.06(b).
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the unities had to be present at the time the estate was created, a subsequent
marriage after two individuals already possessed concurrent interests in an
estate did not transform the estate into a tenancy by the entirety.59 Moreover,
the creation of a tenancy by the entirety was presumed, regardless of the intent
of the parties, when a conveyance of property to a husband and wife met the
five unity requirements.60 This presumption was founded on the legal fiction
that the husband and wife were considered one person, and consequently, the
husband and wife could not truly own the estate concurrently because they
only possessed a single interest.61 Under this presumption, the marital unit
held the estate in its entirety and not in undivided shares per a joint tenancy.62
As women attained increased property rights, tenancy by the entirety
became an unacceptable form of ownership in some states because the
common law preference for the estate was founded on the unity of the spouses
“personified in the husband.”63 Increased property rights for women were
usually established through passage of various Married Women’s Property
Acts, which in some states have been interpreted to impliedly abolish tenancies
by the entirety.64 As the legal status of women began to increase, some states
determined that tenancies by the entirety were the product of a suppressive era
for women, and thus, many states abolished the ownership form.65
III. Tracing Tenancy by the Entirety in Oklahoma
A. Kansas Addressed the Status of Tenancy by the Entirety in 1888
Before statehood, the area now known as Oklahoma was divided on
whether to recognize the common law presumption favoring tenancies by the
entirety for the husband and wife. At that time, Indian Territory66 followed the
common law and Oklahoma Territory preferred tenancies in common.67 The
current status of tenancies by the entirety in Oklahoma traces its roots to the
59. Id.
60. 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.01[2].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. At early common law, husbands were thought to be in sole control of the marital
property. Id.
64. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.06(e).
65. See 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.03[3].
66. Before statehood, Oklahoma was divided into the Indian and Oklahoma Territories.
Oklahoma History, at http://www.state.ok.us/osfdocs/history.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
67. Thomas G. Johnson, Jr., Real Property: Joint Tenancies: Delivery of Deeds, 1 OKLA.
L. REV. 90, 92 (1948) (describing extensively the state of tenancies in the entirety in Oklahoma
as they existed in 1948 and posturing that it was unclear what the passage of title 60, section 74
of the Oklahoma Statutes would do to the status of such estates).
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concepts expressed in Baker v. Stewart,68 an 1888 Kansas Supreme Court
decision.69 In Baker, a husband and wife received a conveyance of land.70
When the wife died, the couple had surviving children, so the issue was
whether the husband and wife had initially taken the property as tenants by the
entirety, thereby creating a right of survivorship.71 If the couple had taken the
property in this form of co-ownership, the husband would be entitled to the
whole property as a result of survivorship.72 But if the husband and wife took
the property as tenants in common, the wife’s interest in the property would
pass through intestate succession to her husband and their children as her
survivors.73
The majority held that because Kansas had not passed a statute governing
conveyances of property to a husband and wife, the conveyance in the case
must follow the common law presumption that the estate was a tenancy by the
entirety.74 The majority also refuted the argument that Kansas’s Married
Women’s Property Act indirectly or impliedly modified the common law.75
The court reasoned that the legislature passed the act to grant married women
expanded property rights and not to take rights away from them.76 The court
determined that women tended to outlive men, and removing the presumption
of a tenancy by the entirety and favoring a tenancy in common would
essentially eviscerate rights of survivorship for many women.77 Thus, in the
Baker majority’s opinion, the passage of the Act had no impact on the tenancy
by the entirety and its validity as a form of concurrent ownership.78
In contrast, the dissent noted that tenancies by the entirety grew from the
common law fiction that the husband and wife, as one legal entity, were
incapable of holding property as joint tenants or tenants in common.79 The
dissenting justice claimed that the Kansas statutes did not favor this common
law fiction and that it was “not applicable to [the] society and institutions” of
68. 19 P. 904 (Kan. 1888).
69. Helvie v. Hoover, 1902 OK 36, ¶ 14, 69 P. 958, 960-61 (deciding that Oklahoma
Territory would follow the more modern law rejecting the presumption favoring tenancies by
the entirety); see Clay v. Robertson, 1912 OK 94, ¶¶ 3-5, 120 P. 1102, 1103 (holding that Indian
Territory would follow the common law presumption favoring tenancies by the entirety).
70. Baker, 19 P. at 904.
71. Id. at 904-05.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 907.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 911 (Horton, C.J., dissenting).
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this country.80 The dissent also disputed the majority’s argument that women
benefitted from the existence of the tenancy by the entirety because they
tended to outlive men.81 The dissent pointed out that mortality rates were
higher for women than men in certain age groups, and accordingly, no clear
conclusion could be drawn regarding which gender benefitted more from the
right of survivorship.82 Clearly, the dissent did not believe tenancies by the
entirety should exist in Kansas because the ownership interest employed a
fiction no longer accepted by society.83
B. Oklahoma Territory Followed Emerging Law
Fourteen years after Baker, Oklahoma Territory considered the same issue
in the 1902 case of Helvie v. Hoover.84 In Helvie, the wife paid for land in
Oklahoma Territory that was conveyed to her and her husband via a warranty
deed.85 The question presented to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma concerned
the type of concurrent estate the husband and wife had in the property.86 The
court stated that the common law clearly favored tenancies by the entirety in
transfers to married couples, but that problems arose when statutes overruled
the common law expressly or by implication, or when the common law
advanced a principle that was inconsistent with modern beliefs concerning
marital relations.87
The Helvie court noted the correct description of the common law rule that
was adopted in Baker, as well as the accurate depiction of the more modern
rule by the Baker dissent.88 Ultimately, the court held that because Oklahoma
Territory had afforded women rights typically granted under Married
Women’s Property Acts, the co-ownership of tenancy by the entirety was
“repugnant” to the rights of women in the Territory.89 Of particular
importance is the fact that although Helvie does not expressly state the
position, the court seemed to hold that tenancies by the entirety did not exist

80. Id. at 910 (Horton, C.J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 912 (Horton, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 916 (Horton, C.J., dissenting).
84. 1902 OK 36, 69 P. 958.
85. Id. ¶ 0, 69 P. at 958.
86. Id. ¶ 1, 69 P. at 959.
87. Id. ¶ 3, 69 P. at 959.
88. Id. ¶ 14, 69 P. at 960-61 (noting that Kansas legislature repudiated the doctrine adopted
by the majority in the first session convened after the decision was rendered).
89. Id. ¶ 15, 69 P. at 961. Oklahoma Territory passed its version of the Married Women’s
Property Act in 1893. Id. ¶ 16, 69 P. at 961.
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at all in Oklahoma Territory because that form of co-ownership was founded
on a repudiated legal fiction.90
C. Indian Territory Followed Common Law Favoring Tenancies by the
Entirety
Twenty-four years after the Baker decision in Kansas, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court decided Clay v. Robertson,91 a case in which the husband and
wife received a patent from the Muskogee Nation granting them property in
Tulsa.92 The issue before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was whether the
estate created was a tenancy by the entirety or some other concurrent estate.93
The court noted that Arkansas statutes and case law governed Indian Territory
and that the issue had been well settled by the Arkansas Supreme Court.94 The
established rule in Arkansas was that conveyances to husbands and wives
created tenancies by the entirety because the trend in the United States to grant
married women more rights through Married Women’s Property Acts did not
impliedly impact such conveyances.95 The Arkansas court reasoned that the
“marriage relation is a peculiar one,” and that laws severing property ties
between the husband and wife weakened such relationships.96 Arkansas
followed a rule its court believed was “sanctioned by divine wisdom.”97 That
rule ultimately favored the husband and wife holding property as a single
entity in a tenancy by the entirety.98
By following Arkansas law, Indian Territory continued to recognize
tenancies by the entirety.99 Notably, this perspective, while shared by the
Kansas Supreme Court majority in Baker,100 conflicted with the position taken
by Oklahoma Territory in Helvie.101 The central issue in both cases was
whether a tenancy by the entirety was an outdated method of owning property
because of women’s increasing property rights.102

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. ¶ 15, 69 P. at 961.
1912 OK 94, 120 P. 1102.
Id. ¶ 2, 120 P. at 1102.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 120 P. at 1102-03.
Id. ¶ 3, 120 P. at 1103 (citing Robinson v. Eagle, 29 Ark. 202 (1874)).
Id. ¶ 4, 120 P. at 1103.
Id. (quoting Robinson, 29 Ark. at 207).
Id. (quoting Robinson, 29 Ark. at 208).
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 120 P. at 1104.
Baker v. Stewart, 19 P. 904, 907 (Kan. 1888).
Helvie v. Hoover, 1902 OK 36, ¶ 15, 69 P. 958, 961.
See Clay, ¶¶ 2-3, 120 P. at 1102-03; Helvie, ¶ 1, 69 P. at 959; Baker, 19 P. at 904-05.
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D. After Statehood, Oklahoma Reaffirmed Acceptance of the Emerging
View
By 1916 when the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided Hamra v.
Fitzpatrick,103 Oklahoma Territory had rejected tenancies by the entirety104
while Indian Territory had accepted them.105 In Hamra, the court was not
presented directly with the issue of whether tenancies by the entirety existed
in the newly formed state of Oklahoma, but rather whether land being held as
homestead property was exempt from levy and execution.106 The couple
claimed that the property had been conveyed to both of them as husband and
wife, and therefore, the property could not be sold to satisfy a judgment
against the husband only.107 The court determined that the property could be
held between husband and wife as tenants in common and remain homestead
property.108 Citing Helvie, the court stated in dicta that a “tenancy by the
entirety [was] not applicable to the conditions in Oklahoma.”109 This language
suggests that the Hamra court did not consider tenancies by the entirety to be
an existing form of concurrent ownership in Oklahoma in 1916.
After Hamra, the Court provided no direction regarding the status of
tenancy by the entirety in Oklahoma until the 1945 case of Mathis v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission.110 In Mathis, the court quoted title 68, section
989 of the Oklahoma Statutes111 as stating that the value of any interest in
property owned by a decedent “and any other person as joint tenants, tenants
in common or tenants by the entirety” was to be used in the calculation of the
decedent’s gross estate.112 The court’s reference to a statute that mentioned
tenancies by the entirety, combined with the simple existence of such a statute,
gave some credence to the argument that tenancies by the entirety existed in
Oklahoma in 1945, despite the decisions in Hamra and Helvie. The reference,
however, was far from conclusive.
By 1945, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s dearth of decisions on the status
of tenancies by the entirety left the issue open for debate.113 It appeared that
joint tenancy was the preferred method of concurrent ownership at the time,
103. 1916 OK 67, 154 P. 665.
104. Helvie, ¶ 15, 69 P. at 961.
105. Clay, ¶ 7, 120 P. at 1104.
106. Hamra, ¶ 1, 154 P. at 665.
107. Id. ¶ 4, 154 P. at 666.
108. Id. ¶ 9, 154 P. at 667.
109. Id.
110. 1945 OK 78, 157 P.2d 156.
111. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 989 (1941) (current version as amended at 68 OKLA. STAT. § 807
(2001)).
112. Mathis, ¶ 9, 157 P.2d at 157.
113. Raymond Everest, Joint Tenancy, 16 OKLA. B.J. 90, 90 (1945).
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but without direction from the court, others outside the judiciary attempted to
clarify the status of tenancies in Oklahoma.114 One attempt at clarification was
by Raymond Everest, an Oklahoma practitioner who, although not directly
examining the issue regarding tenancies by the entirety, commented on the
status of the estates when he wrote that “there can be no question under
[Helvie] but that the common law doctrine of . . . tenancy by entirety does not
[exist] in Oklahoma.”115 Although far from irrefutable, the practitioner’s
opinion clarifies the belief that tenancies by the entirety did not exist in
Oklahoma in 1945. Further clarification occurred just months after the
practitioner stated his opinion when the Oklahoma Legislature passed title 60,
section 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes addressing tenancies by the entirety.116
E. Statutory and Case Law Since 1945 Proves Tenancies by the Entirety
Exist
Title 60, section 74 explicitly states that tenancies by the entirety statutorily
exist.117 Because the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not directly addressed
the statute’s legitimacy, a future case centering on this issue would
undoubtedly hinge on principles of statutory construction.118 Many rules of
statutory construction exist, but it is well-settled that “[t]he determination of
legislative intent controls statutory interpretation,” and it is “presume[d] that
the Legislature intends what it expresses.”119 If the legislature clearly
expresses itself in the statute, construing its intent through statutory
construction is not necessary because no ambiguity exists.120 In either the case
of clear expression or ambiguity in a statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
will presume an existing statute was passed for a reason.121 Because the court
has not ruled on the issue, it is undetermined whether title 60, section 74 is

114. Id.
115. Id. at 92.
116. Act of May 7, 1945, ch. 2, 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws 213 (defining the joint interests of
joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety) (codified at 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001)).
117. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (“Such . . . tenancy by entirety may be created by transfer
[to husbands and wives].”).
118. See, e.g., Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶¶ 6-7, 81 P.3d 652, 655 (determining proper
construction in a case of first impression regarding statutory attorney’s fees); Blitz U.S.A., Inc.
v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2003 OK 50, ¶ 14, 75 P.3d, 883, 887-88 (analyzing income tax question
of first impression using statutory construction if a statute is ambiguous).
119. See, e.g., Okla. Ass’n for Equitable Taxation v. Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, ¶ 5, 901
P.2d 800, 803.
120. Id. ¶ 10, 901 P.2d at 804.
121. Id. (stating that the Oklahoma Supreme Court “will not presume that the Legislature
acted in vain in promulgating a statute”).
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clear or ambiguous.122 It is certain, however, that the statute exists, and
consequently the court would presume that tenancies by the entirety statutorily
exist in Oklahoma.123
Some Oklahoma case law regarding the status of tenancies by the entirety
exists, but the cases are sparse and not directly on point.124 The closest the
court came to actually recognizing the statutorily created tenancy by the
entirety was in 1953 in Flesher v. Flesher.125 The court addressed whether title
60, section 74 contemplated rights of survivorship for joint tenants.126
Although the court did not directly address the existence of tenancies by the
entirety in Oklahoma, it stated that “a joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety is
expressly recognized by our statute.”127 The majority opinion in Flesher,
however, is not the first Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion to recognize that
tenancies by the entirety statutorily exist. In Draughon v. Wright,128 a 1948
case addressing co-ownership of property and the right of survivorship
applicable to title 60, section 74, the dissenting opinion stated that
“[p]rovisions of statute creating joint tenancy . . . contemplate a tenancy by
entirety . . . .”129 These express statements by the court, although not
controlling on the issue, support the proposition that the ability to create
tenancies by the entirety is a statutory right in Oklahoma.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in 1994, decided Gazalski
v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram)130 and quoted title 60, section 74.131 The
statute contains provisions for both the creation of joint tenancies and
tenancies by the entirety.132 The issue in Gazalski was once again whether
property described as “joint,” but lacking any language of “survivorship,”

122. See Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 6, 16 P.3d 1120, 1123 (resolving a
case of first impression concerning statutory construction calls for de novo review).
123. Okla. Ass’n for Equitable Taxation, ¶ 5, 901 P.2d at 803.
124. The court has never actually addressed tenancies by the entirety directly. Reference
to the form of co-ownership has been in regard to other issues. The court has quoted title 60,
section 74 because the statute also established the creation of joint tenancies, which is a more
common form of co-ownership than tenancies by the entirety. For examples of cases citing the
statute for issues involving joint tenancy, see Gazalski v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram), 1994
OK 51, 874 P.2d 1282; Raney v. Diehl, 1971 OK 28, 482 P.2d 585; Barton v. Hooker, 1955 OK
78, 283 P.2d 514.
125. 1953 OK 392, 258 P.2d 899.
126. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 258 P.2d at 902.
127. Id.
128. 1948 OK 81, 191 P.2d 921.
129. Id. ¶ 1, 191 P.2d at 925 (Riley, J., dissenting).
130. 1994 OK 51, 874 P.2d 1282.
131. Id. ¶ 9, 874 P.2d at 1285 n.1.
132. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001).
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created a valid joint tenancy.133 The court had no reason to determine the
existence of tenancies by the entirety and did not decide the issue.134 The
court’s mentioning of the statute and the statute’s existence once again
reaffirmed that tenancies by the entirety are a legitimate form of co-ownership
in Oklahoma. Because this form of cotenancy exists, it is necessary to perform
statutory construction to determine the actual effect of tenancies by the entirety
in Oklahoma. Further, an examination of other states’ applications of their
statutes proves helpful in the interpretation of the Oklahoma statute.135
IV. Actual Effect of Title 60, Section 74 on Tenancies by the Entirety
As mentioned previously in this note,136 the right of survivorship
distinguishes joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety from tenancies in
common.137 Limitations on the individual spouses’ abilities to transfer their
interests distinguish tenancies by the entirety from joint tenancies.138 These
limitations are: (1) the spouses’ inability to voluntarily or involuntarily
alienate their interests inter vivos without the consent of the other spouse; and
(2) the inability to transfer the interest at death via testate or intestate
succession.139 Whether the right of survivorship and these limitations
specifically apply to tenancies by the entirety in Oklahoma in light of the
existing statute remains an unsettled question.
A. The Statute Contemplates an Implied Right of Survivorship
Title 60, section 74 does not expressly mention that a joint tenancy or a
tenancy by the entirety created in accordance with the statute contains a right
of survivorship between the cotenants.140 Although the issue of survivorship
has not been directly addressed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court regarding
tenancies by the entirety, the court has held that the statute does not indicate
an intention contrary to common law.141 Therefore, the term “joint tenancy”
133. Gazalski, ¶ 1, 874 P.2d at 1284.
134. See id. ¶ 29, 874 P.2d at 1289.
135. Dolese Bros. Co. v. State, 2003 OK 4, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d 1093, 1099 (citing Cain’s Coffee
Co. v. City of Muskogee, 1935 OK 450, ¶ 12, 44 P.2d 50, 52, for its use of an Illinois Supreme
Court definition of “manufacturing” to aid in statutory construction of an Oklahoma statute).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
137. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.02.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001); see, e.g., Flesher v. Flesher, 1953 OK 392, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d
899, 902 (holding title 60, section 74 does not contemplate a joint tenancy without a right of
survivorship even though the statute does not expressly mention the right).
141. Flesher, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d at 902 (citing construction in Draughon v. Wright, 1948 OK 81,
¶ 9, 191 P.2d 921, 923, that a statutory right of survivorship existed because the right existed
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should be given its common law understanding, which includes a right of
survivorship.142 Similar to joint tenancy, the legislature did not define tenancy
by the entirety.143 As a result, the term should be given its common law
understanding,144 which also includes a right of survivorship.145
Not only does Oklahoma’s statute contemplate a right of survivorship, but
other jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety also recognize that
the right of survivorship is integral to the form of cotenancy. Some states
expressly recognize the survivorship interest in their statutes, thereby allowing
creation of tenancies by the entirety.146 Other states accept a right of
survivorship in accordance with common law when a statute is silent on the
issue.147
As for jurisdictions within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
Utah refers to tenancies by the entirety in several statutes in the Utah Code.
Most notably, Utah’s Probate Code expressly recognizes a right of
survivorship for tenants by the entirety, obviating the need for inference.148
Going beyond the current Utah Code, the Utah Supreme Court has also
recognized that tenancy by the entirety possesses a right of survivorship even
though decisions regarding the issue are limited.149 Accordingly, either by
statute or by court decision, Utah recognizes a right of survivorship for
tenancies by the entirety.
Wyoming, another state within the Tenth Circuit, statutorily recognizes
tenancies by the entirety,150 but the statute does not control the creation of the
estates or any rights of survivorship.151 The statute instead codifies the
at common law, and the Legislature did not clearly abrogate that right).
142. Id.
143. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001).
144. See Flesher, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d at 902.
145. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.02.
146. See, e.g., N.J. STAT . ANN . § 37:2-18 (West 2002) (“Any such conveyance heretofore
or hereafter made shall convey the entire estate and interest of a married man or married woman
in lands held by such husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, including the right of
survivorship . . . .”).
147. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-b (McKinney 1989). An identical statute,
section 442.025 of the Missouri Statutes, was interpreted to allow a right of survivorship. Kluck
v. Metsger, 349 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Mo. 1961).
148. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-702 (2004) (“For the purposes of this subsection, ‘co-owners
with right of survivorship’ includes joint tenants, tenants by the entireties, and other co-owners
of property . . . .”).
149. See, e.g., In re Cowan’s Estate, 99 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1940) (citing a now-repealed
statute that when property is held in a joint tenancy or as a tenancy by the entireties a right of
survivorship exists).
150. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-140 (Michie 2004).
151. In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (citing Wambeke v. Hopkin,
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principle that if a spouse owns a piece of property in severalty, the person can
create a tenancy by the entirety with the other spouse without the use of a
strawman.152 Because Wyoming’s statute does not control the creation of
tenancies by the entirety, the creation of the estate is ostensibly a product of
common law, which includes a right of survivorship.153
As for other states within the Tenth Circuit, Kansas, both by statute154 and
case law,155 no longer recognizes tenancies by the entirety. Moreover, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has held that its state legislature abrogated tenancies
by the entirety within the state by adopting a community property system.156
It is unclear whether Colorado even recognizes the form of co-ownership at
all.157
In Oklahoma, the common law right of survivorship should be accepted for
tenancies by the entirety. Recognizing the right would keep the form of coownership consistent with the court’s decision in Flesher, holding that joint
tenancies created via title 60, section 74 receive the right of survivorship even
though the statute is silent. Also, Oklahoma’s recognition of the right would
correspond with other states, like Utah and Wyoming, that recognize that
tenancies by the entirety include a right of survivorship. This right of
survivorship distinguishes tenancies by the entirety from tenancies in common,
but if the Oklahoma statute does not follow the common law limitations on
individual ownership transfers, this crucial difference will continue to be
ignored in Oklahoma.158

372 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1962) to explain that tenancies by the entirety are not statutorily created
but are a product of common law requiring a right of survivorship).
152. Id. A strawman at common law was a third party who would take title to property from
one or more co-owner(s) and transfer the title back to the co-owner(s) to sever or create some
of the four unities and change the type of ownership interest in the property. See 7 POWELL,
supra note 3, § 1.07.
153. In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. at 486.
154. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1994) (explaining that a conveyance to a husband and wife
creates a tenancy in common unless the conveyance clearly establishes a joint tenancy).
155. Walnut Valley State Bank v. Stovall, 566 P.2d 33, 37 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977), rev’d on
other grounds, 574 P.2d 1382 (Kan. 1978).
156. Swink v. Fingado, 850 P.2d 978, 982 n.9 (N.M. 1993); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 403-8 (Michie 2004).
157. Thompson G. Marsh, Tenancy by the Entirety in Colorado, 13 COLO. LAW. 230, 230
(1984) (citing Whyman v. Johnson, 163 P. 76 (Colo. 1917) for its dicta that tenancies by the
entirety may not be a valid form of cotenancy in Colorado).
158. See 60 O KLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (stating “[n]othing herein contained shall prevent
execution, levy and sale of the interest of the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale shall
constitute a severance”).
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B. Individual Voluntary or Involuntary Transfers of Property Interests
Inherent in the common law understanding of tenancies by the entirety is
the inability of an individual spouse to transfer, voluntarily or involuntarily,
his interest in the entireties property without the consent of the other spouse.159
The limitation exists to avoid any destruction of the right of survivorship that
this type of co-ownership embraces.160 Without this limitation, the estate
would be held simply in a joint tenancy.161 The older theoretical basis for
limiting individual transferability was that the husband and wife were
considered one entity, so there was no individual interest that could be
transferred.162 A more modern policy argument for limiting individual
transferability is one focused on protection of the family unit. Specifically, it
would be unfair to allow one spouse to destroy the other spouse’s right of
survivorship.163
Because the Oklahoma legislature did not clearly define tenancies by the
entirety, its common law understanding should be given effect.164 Accepting
the common law meaning would result in the spouses’ inability to individually
transfer their interest in the estate in any manner.165 If Oklahoma followed the
common law, voluntary conveyances, such as an inter vivos sale, the granting
of a lien, or a devise at death by individual spouses would not be allowed.166
Further adherence to the common law would prevent creditors from pursuing
an involuntary conveyance of the property, such as a judgment lien or levy, to
satisfy one spouse’s debt.167 The legislature, however, qualified the common
law tenancy by the entirety when it inserted the provision “[n]othing herein
contained shall prevent execution, levy and sale of the interest of the judgment
debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a severance.”168
The legislature’s intent behind this clause limiting the protection of a
spouse’s survivorship interest in the tenancy by the entirety is not clear.
Because the qualification only applies in situations involving judgment
debtors, and thus involuntary conveyances only, Oklahoma should still apply
the common law tenancy by the entirety in matters not involving judgment
159. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.02.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. § 33.07(e).
163. Id.
164. Flesher v. Flesher, 1953 OK 392, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d 899, 902 (giving common law
understanding to joint tenancy).
165. 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.03[1].
166. Id.
167. Id. § 52.03[3].
168. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (emphasis added).
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debtors.169 Thus, Oklahoma should disallow any voluntary conveyances not
approved by the non-conveying spouse. In turn, an individual spouse in
Oklahoma, as at common law, should not be able to sever the right of
survivorship by voluntarily transferring or encumbering the property either
during his or her life or upon his death.170 Because the legislature chose to
address the involuntary conveyance to a judgment creditor,171 the more
difficult question is how to treat these involuntary conveyances, such as a
judgment lien, by an individual debtor spouse. To understand how the
Oklahoma statute should be interpreted, it is helpful to consider the law in
other jurisdictions.172
As stated previously, Utah and Wyoming are the only two states in the
Tenth Circuit, other than Oklahoma, that explicitly recognize tenancies by the
entirety in a statutory scheme.173 Utah, as determined by the Utah Supreme
Court, allows spouses holding property as tenants by the entirety to alienate
their individual interests and destroy the other spouse’s right of survivorship.174
Accordingly, any purchaser or attaching creditor then becomes a tenant in
common with the remaining spouse.175 Wyoming does not allow individual
spousal alienability in any way, voluntarily or involuntarily.176 The Supreme
Court of Wyoming has gone so far as to state, “[i]f this [common law doctrine]
interferes too much with the rights of creditors as held in some of the cases, the
remedy should be provided by the legislature.”177 To date, the law in
Wyoming is unchanged, and creditors of an individual spouse cannot reach
property held in tenancy by the entirety.178
169. See Flesher v. Flesher, 1953 OK 392, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d 899, 902 (stating that “[t]he term
‘joint tenancy’ had a well defined meaning at common law, and, since the Legislature did not
define the term or use language indicating a contrary intention, we must presume that it used
the term in its technical common law sense”).
170. See 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 52.03[1].
171. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74.
172. Dolese Bros. Co. v. State, 2003 OK 4, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d 1093, 1100 (citing Cain’s Coffee
Co. v. City of Muskogee, 1935 OK 450, ¶ 12, 44 P.2d 50, 52, for the court’s use of an Illinois
Supreme Court definition of “manufacturing” to aid in statutory construction of an Oklahoma
statute).
173. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-702 (2004); In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. D.
Wyo. 1985).
174. Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1977).
175. Id.
176. Lurie v. Blackwell, 51 P.3d 846, 851 (Wyo. 2002) (“Neither Wyoming nor Missouri
law allows a judgment creditor to seize property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety to satisfy the individual debts of one of the spouses.”); Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen,
297 P.2d 213, 219-20 (Wyo. 1956).
177. Ward Terry & Co., 297 P.2d at 220.
178. See Lurie, 51 P.3d at 851.
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As far as involuntary conveyances to creditors are concerned, Wyoming law
follows the majority view that creditors of individual spouses cannot reach the
spouse’s interest in an entirety estate.179 Sawada v. Endo,180 a leading Hawaii
case that explores the majority rule, held that “under the Married Women’s
Property Acts the interest of a husband or a wife in an estate by the entireties
is not subject to the claims of his or her individual creditors . . . .”181 Sawada
cited a number of jurisdictions for the proposition that the very nature of a
tenancy by the entirety forbids a unilateral conveyance that destroys the right
of survivorship.182 Consequently, the Hawaii Supreme Court was not faced
with a policy decision between creditors or the familial unit.183 Although
Hawaii and other jurisdictions follow the majority rule that tenancies by the
entirety do not allow either voluntary or involuntary unilateral conveyances,
many of these jurisdictions rely on interpretation of Married Women’s
Property Acts and court-created law.184 Oklahoma is different from these
jurisdictions because its existing statute expressly states that judgment
creditors can levy the entireties estate to satisfy the debts of an individual
spouse.185 In further contrast to the majority rule against any type of unilateral
conveyance of the entireties property is United States v. Craft,186 a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision that held that federal tax creditors could reach
entireties property to satisfy the individual tax debt of one of the spouses.187
C. Craft: Entireties Property Is Not Safe from Certain Creditors
The issue in Craft was whether an individual spouse as a tenant by the
entirety possessed “property” or “rights in property” that could be pursued by
the federal government to satisfy the individual spouse’s federal tax lien.188
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the spouses possessed individual property
rights in the entireties estate, as defined by Michigan law, which could be the
subject of a lien.189 Thus, if one of the spouses has a separate, unpaid tax
179. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.07(e) (citing Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw.
1977), as an example of support for the majority rule). See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note
1, § 5.5; J.H. Cooper, Annotation, Interest of Spouse in Estate by the Entireties as Subject to
Satisfaction of His or Her Individual Debt, 75 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1961) (updated Dec. 2004).
180. 561 P.2d 1291.
181. Id. at 1295.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1297.
184. Id. at 1295; see also 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.07(e).
185. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2001).
186. 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
187. Id. at 276.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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burden, the federal government could pursue the entireties property to satisfy
that tax burden.190 The opinion stated that the Court must look to state law to
determine what property rights exist, but the question of whether those
property rights can be reached by a federal tax lien is a federal question that
does not rely on state law.191
The Craft decision supports the position that at least some creditors should
be able to reach entireties property,192 and the decision undoubtedly affects
tenancies by the entirety in Oklahoma. The only issue that Craft seems to
address relevant to Oklahoma is that federal creditors can pursue entireties
property to satisfy an individual spouse’s federal tax debt.193 The decision
leaves in place any existing state law regarding the ability of state creditors to
reach the entireties property.194 The question of the ability of state creditors
to reach entireties property remains unanswered — except for the provision in
title 60, section 74 that seemingly allows all judgment creditors, federal and
state, to pursue entireties property to satisfy the debts of individual spouses.195
D. A Judgment Creditor Forcing an Involuntary Conveyance Becomes a
Tenant in Common
At a minimum, federal tax creditors can force an involuntary conveyance
of an individual spouse’s interest in entireties property.196 Thus, two questions
remain: (1) what ownership interest do these, and possibly other judgment
creditors receive; and (2) at what point does the right of survivorship
terminate, if at all? In answering the first question, of the three forms of
concurrent ownership discussed in this note, only a tenancy in common or
joint tenancy are possible choices because a tenancy by the entirety requires
the co-owners to be husband and wife.197 The answer to the second question
depends greatly on the answer to the first.
Judgment creditors will not receive a joint tenancy ownership interest with
the remaining spouse. In Oklahoma, the four unities of time, title, interest, and
190. See id.
191. Id. at 278. “We recognize that Michigan makes a different choice with respect to state
law creditors: ‘[L]and held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not subject to levy
under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or wife alone.’” Id. at 288
(quoting Sanford v. Bertrau, 169 N.W. 880, 881 (Mich. 1918)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 60 O KLA. STAT. § 74 (2001) (stating “[n]othing herein contained shall prevent
execution, levy and sale of the interest of the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale
shall constitute a severance”).
196. Craft, 535 U.S. at 288.
197. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.08.
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possession must be present to create a joint tenancy.198 Because the judgment
creditor obtained its interest at a different time and by a different method than
the remaining spouse, the unities of time and title would be lacking, so no joint
tenancy could be created.199 A joint tenancy in Oklahoma can be created
pursuant to title 60, section 74 without the four unities if the conveying
instrument expressly declared that a joint tenancy was to be created.200 It is
unlikely, however, that an involuntary transfer to a judgment creditor will
contain an express provision to create a joint tenancy between the creditor and
the remaining spouse.
Tenancy in common is the favored form of co-ownership in Oklahoma and
would most likely be the form of concurrent ownership between a remaining
spouse and a judgment creditor.201 In Oklahoma, tenants in common have a
joint interest in the estate, but hold separate and distinct titles that allow the
tenants in common to transfer their interests voluntarily or involuntarily.202
Tenants in common do not enjoy a right of survivorship,203 so the question
remains whether the judgment creditor becomes a tenant in common on the
filing of the judgment lien or on the actual execution sale of the property.
Because case law in Oklahoma regarding the existence of tenancies by the
entirety does not exist, there is consequently no case law concerning the
severance of tenancies by the entirety and its right of survivorship by
conveyances to judgment creditors. To determine how a court might rule on
the issue, it is helpful to look at case law concerning the severance of joint
tenancies and the effect on its right of survivorship. In Oklahoma, the
attachment of a lien by levy or by filing a judgment lien suffices to destroy the
joint tenancy and the right of survivorship.204 If the joint tenancy were not
severed by the attachment of the lien, the joint tenancy would be severed by

198. Clovis v. Clovis, 1969 OK 170, ¶ 11, 460 P.2d 878, 881-82.
199. Id.
200. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74; Raney v. Diehl, 1971 OK 28, ¶¶ 17-18, 482 P.2d 585, 590.
201. Gazalski v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram), 1994 OK 51, ¶ 24, 874 P.2d 1282, 1288; see
also 84 OKLA. STAT. § 184 (2001) (stating that a devise to two or more persons creates a
tenancy in common); 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (codifying that express words are necessary to create
a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety).
202. See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 1998 OK 66, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 831, 834 (holding that
joint tenants in a tenancy in common have distinct title despite their joint interest in the
property).
203. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 33.02.
204. See 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 51.04(1)(c) (citing Ladd v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 1984 OK 60, ¶ 4, 688 P.2d 59, 61).
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the execution sale of the property.205 To keep the severance survivorship rights
consistent, Oklahoma should apply its joint tenancy precedent to tenancies by
the entirety and establish the rule that tenancies by the entirety are severed on
the attachment of the lien and not on execution sale.
E. Summary of the Current Status of Tenancies by the Entirety in Oklahoma
A tenancy by the entirety is a valid form of concurrent ownership in
Oklahoma because explicit statutory language allows such creation.206 The
effects of allowing tenancies by the entirety in Oklahoma are: (1) the husband
and wife creating the estate enjoy the right of survivorship that existed at
common law207 and that many other jurisdictions recognize;208 (2) individual
spouses are not allowed to voluntarily transfer their ownership interests
without the consent of the other spouse;209 and (3) individual spouses are
required to involuntarily transfer their interests to judgment creditors.210 Craft
supports the position allowing involuntary transfers to at least some judgment
creditors.211
By disallowing individual voluntary conveyances but allowing individual
involuntary conveyances, Oklahoma has a unique form of tenancy by the
entirety.212 The Oklahoma tenancy by the entirety, however, is practical and
strikes a desirable balance between a policy favoring creditors and a policy
favoring the family. It is true that a spouse who wishes to unilaterally sever
the right of survivorship may manipulate Oklahoma’s form of tenancy by the
entirety. The spouse may take an unsecured loan from the potential purchaser
instead of voluntarily transferring his interest; he could then default on that
205. See 7 POWELL, supra note 3, § 51.04. Requiring a creditor to actually sell the property
to sever the joint tenancy means that the creditor must sell the property before the debtor joint
tenant dies, or the creditor’s interest would be extinguished. Id.
206. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74.
207. Flesher v. Flesher, 1953 OK 392, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d 899, 902; 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4,
§ 33.02.
208. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-702 (2004) (“For the purposes of this subsection,
‘co-owners with right of survivorship’ includes joint tenants, tenants by the entireties, and other
co-owners of property.”).
209. Flesher, ¶ 11, 258 P.2d at 902 (citing construction in Draughon v. Wright, 1948 OK 81,
¶ 9, 191 P.2d 921, 923, for the proposition that if the legislature did not indicate a contrary
intention then a term with a well-defined common law meaning should continue having that
meaning in the statute).
210. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (stating “[n]othing herein contained shall prevent execution, levy
and sale of the interest of the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a
severance”).
211. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002).
212. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Haw. 1977); see also 4 THOMPSON, supra
note 4, 33.07(e) (stating that the majority of states do not allow either type of transfer).
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loan and the “creditor” could then pursue judicial measures to reach the
property being held in a tenancy by the entirety. It is questionable whether this
type of transaction could produce a unilateral transfer of a spouse’s interest,
but requiring the “creditor” to pursue court action would be a deterrent to such
dealings. For those judgment creditors who successfully pursue entireties
estates, they would become tenants in common with the remaining spouse and
sever the right of survivorship.213
V. Conclusion
Despite the limiting language of the statute, Oklahoma’s form of tenancy
by the entirety gives husbands and wives a co-ownership option that differs
from a joint tenancy. Two features of the tenancy give security to the marital
relationship concerning the property owned by the spouses: (1) spouses enjoy
the survivorship right that exists for joint tenancies and allows them to protect
the estate from any testacy or intestacy conveyances; and (2) an estate held as
tenancy by the entirety protects one spouse from the other spouse’s voluntary
conveyance of the property. Oklahoma, however, does not provide the highest
level of security for spouses because it allows judgment creditors freedom to
satisfy debts owed by an individual spouse by pursuing the tenancy by the
entirety property. This unique variation from traditional tenancies by the
entirety recognizes the importance of credit in today’s society. Striking the
balance between a policy protecting marital property and a policy protecting
creditor’s rights makes the tenancy by the entirety a form of concurrent
ownership that should be used more often in Oklahoma.
Tom R. Russell

213. See Gazalski v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram), 1994 OK 51, ¶ 24, 874 P.2d 1282, 1288
(discussing presumption of a tenancy in common); see also Matthews v. Matthews, 1998 OK
66, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 831, 834-35 (discussing cotenancy relationship).
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